Some purchasers are attempting to foster competition in health insurance markets by creating incentives for consumers to choose among health plans on the basis of price and quality. However, this ''managed competition'' approach also raises new challenges. Unless plan payments adequately reflect the expected health needs of a plan's enrollees, health plans have incentives to ''risk select,'' that is, avoid enrollees with high health costs (Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000) . To address this problem, researchers have developed several systems to formally adjust premiums paid to health plans based on the composition of plan enrollment.
Some purchasers are attempting to foster competition in health insurance markets by creating incentives for consumers to choose among health plans on the basis of price and quality. However, this ''managed competition'' approach also raises new challenges. Unless plan payments adequately reflect the expected health needs of a plan's enrollees, health plans have incentives to ''risk select,'' that is, avoid enrollees with high health costs (Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000) . To address this problem, researchers have developed several systems to formally adjust premiums paid to health plans based on the composition of plan enrollment.
Formal risk adjustment has attracted attention recently due to the Medicare program's phase-in of diagnosis-based risk-adjusted payments for MedicareϩChoice health plans, which began in 2000. In fact, much of the research literature on formal risk adjustment has focused on its applications to public programs such as Medicare and Medicaid ( Van de Ven and Ellis 2000) . This paper considers a relatively less studied aspect of formal risk adjustment: its use by private, as well as public purchasers.
In this paper, we define formal risk adjustment as the adjustment of premiums paid to health plans based on a formula employing individual-level diagnostic or demographic information. The goal of formal risk adjustment is to enable purchasers to minimize plan incentives to risk select by shifting premium payments from plans with healthier-than-average enrollees to plans with sicker-than-average enrollees. In demographic and diagnosis-based risk adjustment, weights are created that reflect the differences in relative costs among types of enrollees.
For example, if gender and age categories are to be used as risk adjusters, weights must be determined for each age-gender combination.
This paper describes the prevalence of formal risk adjustment of health insurance premiums paid to health plans by Medicare, Medicaid, state governments, and private payers.
1 Employers adjust their premiums for risk in several different ways, as discussed subsequently. However, formal risk adjustment, one of the mechanisms for adjusting for risk, is rarely used. We find that while public purchasers rely heavily on formal risk adjustment, very few private purchasers use formal risk adjustment to pay health plans. Indeed, among private employers, which account for the vast majority of enrollees in health plans, formal risk adjustment is virtually nonexistent, with the exception of a few purchasing coalitions. While our paper focuses on the prevalence of formal risk adjustment in 1998, we also have attempted to assemble data on its use in more recent years. We find little evidence that use of formal risk adjustment among private employers is increasing.
This paper begins by discussing the problem of risk selection and the range of practices available to purchasers to address selection problems in the Medicare/Medicaid, large employer, and small employer segments of the health insurance market. Next, we present information on the prevalence of formal risk adjustment by public and private purchasers and on purchaser assessments of formal risk adjustment. We then provide examples of two approaches that are related to formal risk adjustment, followed by a brief conclusion.
Risk Selection and Methods for Adjusting for Risk in Public and Private Health Insurance Markets
This section discusses how the structure of health insurance markets affects the need and methods available for adjusting for risk. This context is important because formal risk adjustment is one option among many practices used to address risk selection. Although the problem of risk selection has been covered in many papers, there has been little discussion of how the differences in payers' circumstances relate to their choice of methods of dealing with selectionrelated issues (see, however, Swartz 1995) .
Typical risk adjustment practices vary based on the characteristics of three distinct segments of the health insurance market: public purchasers; large employers; and small employers. Public purchasers include the Medicare and Medicaid programs. For purposes of discussion, we divide private purchasers into large employers (more than 50 employees) and small employers (fewer than 50 employees). While some further distinctions are made within the category, large employers share many similar features with regard to risk selection even at this relatively low employment cutoff. Since we focus on group purchasing, the individual insurance market is not discussed.
In the Medicare market, beneficiaries choose between traditional fee-for-service Medicare and available health plans. Premiums that health plans charge beneficiaries are often lower than the private Medigap insurance that many beneficiaries buy to supplement traditional Medicare. Health plans also have offered supplemental benefits beyond Medicare-covered services (Laschober et al. 1999) . Medicare beneficiaries currently have the option to disenroll from a health plan (and enroll in a different plan or return to fee-for-service care) every 30 days.
Because of the wide variance in health status and spending per Medicare beneficiary, a payment system that does not adjust payments adequately to reflect expected health costs will create incentives to risk select for plans and beneficiaries. For example, costs for a beneficiary with HIV/AIDS or a blood or lymphatic cancer are more than five times those of otherwise similar beneficiaries . The incentives to risk select are exacerbated by beneficiaries' ability to disenroll every 30 days, although by 2002 beneficiaries will be allowed to change plans only during an open enrollment period in November or during their first three months in a plan. In the past, Medicare capitation rates paid to health plans were set by the federal government based on average costs per Medicare beneficiary in a geographic region, adjusted for the demographic factors of age, gender, welfare status, and institutional status (Greenwald et al. 1998 ). Due to congressional mandate, formal risk adjustment of premium payments began in 2000, as discussed in the upcoming ''prevalence'' section. Formal risk adjustment is intended to reduce problems of (favorable) risk selection, which many studies have identified in this market (MedPAC 2000; Morgan et al. 1997; Greenwald, Ingber, and Levy 2000) .
A notable feature of Medicare's contracting practice is that, given the prices Medicare establishes for beneficiaries through formal risk adjustment, it is a plan's decision whether to contract with Medicare. That is, by regulation, Medicare must contract with any qualified plan willing to take the program's price and abide by its rules; Medicare may not refuse to contract with a qualified plan. The inability to select a limited set of plans is a potentially salient difference between the circumstances of Medicare and private employers. No private employer that we are aware of takes a contracting approach of accepting ''any willing'' health plan in its market area.
In the Medicaid program, managed care enrollment is often mandatory for designated groups of beneficiaries.
2 Typically, beneficiaries may choose between at least two health plans. Out-of-pocket payments are limited, reflecting statutory requirements, and benefits are nominally standard across plans. The variance in payments for disabled beneficiaries (a group that includes individuals with mental retardation as well as those with chronic health conditions) is greater than that of low-income women and children (Kronick et al. 2000) . Contrary to the perception that states are not enrolling disabled Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care, approximately one million of the 5.9 million nonelderly Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities (17%) were enrolled in capitated managed care in 1998 (Regenstein and Schroer 1998) .
Methods of establishing plan payment rates vary by state, but are either set by states, negotiated between states and health plans, or established through competitive bidding (Holahan, Rangarajan, and Shirmer 1999) . In 1998, about half of states with fully capitated Medicaid managed care programs set rates in reference to fee-for-service rates, which are typically lower than Medicare payment rates (Holahan et al. 1999) . In Medicaid, risk selection may pose particular challenges for health plans formed by traditional safety-net providers, but can be a concern in all contexts in which beneficiaries choose among competing health plans (Grogan and Gusmano 1999) . In the following discussion, we present evidence that most states do adjust for age, gender, and eligibility category, and a growing number of states have implemented more complex formal risk adjustment practices.
The large employer segment of the health insurance market differs greatly from that of Medicare and Medicaid. Relative to public purchasers, large employers may choose from additional practices that effectively address risk selection problems (Glazer and McGuire 2001 discuss these strategies). First, larger private purchasers (usually more than 200 employees) may decide to ''self-insure,'' meaning that they pay the claims incurred by their employees or beneficiaries plus a fee to the health plan administering the benefits. Such firms' health care costs thus track the actual use of medical care by their employees. This practice has become increasingly common, even among firms with as few as 100 employees, in part because self-insured firms are exempt from state benefit mandates. An estimated 48 million employees and dependents are enrolled in self-insured plans (McDonnell and Fronstin 1999; InterStudy 2000) . Since health plans are not at risk for medical care, the incentive for risk selection at the plan level is removed.
Large employers make additional decisions that influence the potential for risk selection. In particular, although many large employers offer a choice of products (a health maintenance organization [ HMO] , a preferred provider organization [PPO] , and a pointof-service [POS] plan, for example), employers often contract with one carrier to provide all products. Because the entire risk pool of employees remains with the one carrier, there are no incentives at the plan level to influence risk selection among the various products. In fact, large employers offer a choice of carrier relatively infrequently: in 1997, 15% of firms with 500 or more employees offered a choice of carrier (32% of employees with choice), while 13% of firms with 50 to 499 employees (18% of employees) did so (Marquis and Long 1999a ; see also Frank and Rosenthal 2001 for discussion of implications for employers' adoption of formal risk adjustment).
Furthermore, even when large employers contract with multiple carriers, the extent of risk selection will be influenced by the premium contribution structure adopted by employers (see Encinosa and Selden 2001; Feldman, Dowd and Maciejewski 2001) . If an employer pays the full premium cost of all plans offered, healthy as well as sicker employees may choose a more generous plan, thereby limiting risk selection problems. However, if employers contribute a fixed percentage or dollar amount toward premiums, sicker employees have greater incentives to sort into more generous plans, and healthier employees, the converse, leading to more selection (Cutler and Reber 1998; Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000) . Among the subset of employers that offered a choice of product or carrier in 1997, 36% of firms with 500 or more employees contributed a fixed contribution, and 47% a fixed percentage of the premium (Marquis and Long 1999a) . The shares for firms of 50 to 499 employees were 29% and 34%, respectively (Marquis and Long 1999a) . Thus, risk selection may remain a problem for large employers that offer a choice of plans and a fixed contribution or percent contribution toward premiums (Sturm 2001; Cain 2000; Connolly 2000) .
In addition to the aforementioned practices (i.e., self-insurance, single carriers), the payment methods in place for large employers may achieve goals similar to formal risk adjustment. In contrast to the Medicare program, in which payments are set largely by the federal government, in the private sector payment rates often are established by health plans, in negotiation with employers. Here we discuss two approaches to setting rates: experience rating and community rating by class. In experience rating, the prior year(s) health plan expenditures are used as a basis for the next year's premiums. Because individual-level variations tend to average out as the group size increases, health plans regard experience data for large firms as highly credible (Sturm 2001) . Rates for very large firms (more than 1,000 employees) may be based entirely on past experience (Sturm 2001) . If the average risk characteristics of a private employer's enrollees remain roughly constant in a plan over time, experience-related rates are useful in aligning premium payments with expected costsone of the objectives of formal risk adjustment.
Health plans also may rely upon actuarial adjustments (sometimes in combination with experience rating) to establish payments. Actuarial adjustments may take different forms, including adjustments of premiums based on a set of benefits for contract mix (single/couple/family) using actuarial tables or data specific to the employment group (adjusted community rating) (Lippe 2001) . The most data-intensive approach, community rating by class, adjusts average benefit premiums based on characteristics of a specific employment group, including age and gender, industry class, contract mix, and family size (Lippe 2001) . By adjusting for the age and gender of a specific employment group, this approach (particularly in the context of a single carrier) is similar to formal risk adjustment approaches that rely on the same demographic information.
Some employers use other methods that are related to the practice we have defined as formal risk adjustment. A few employers assess the risk allocated across contracting health plans according to a formula, but do not formally adjust premium rates. Instead, they use that information as a basis for negotiation of the rates. In another approach related to formal risk adjustment, employers that contribute part of their employees' health insurance premium adjust these contributions based on employees' demographics and/or health status (rather than adjust premiums paid to plans). Adjusting premium contributions can address adverse selection at the level of employee selection of health plans (see Feldman, Dowd, and Maciejewski 2001 for discussion of what they refer to as ''demand-side risk adjustment''). We later describe several examples of employers that rely on risk assessment or adjustment of premium contributions.
Small employers possess fewer tools to address risk selection and face distinct selection problems compared to large employers. Although small employers have shifted from offering predominantly indemnity-style plans to managed care plans, few small employers offer a choice of carrier (4% of firms with fewer than 50 employees) or product (9% of firms); only a fifth of employers that offer choice pay fixed premium contributions (Morrisey and Jensen 1997; Marquis and Long 1999a) . This tool for reducing selection, commonly used by large employers, does not achieve the same result for small employers because they are unable to average out risks over a large employee population.
The main problem is that, due to their size, small employers face the potential for wide variation in expenditures and possess less ability to pool populations with greater and lesser health needs (Cutler 1994) . Self-insurance is not a viable option for them. It is also well established that small employers are less likely to offer insurance than larger employers (Levitt et al. 2000) . In practice, the firms that do not provide coverage tend to have healthier employees, resulting in less risk pooling and higher premiums for small employers that do offer coverage (Sturm 2001) . In small employer markets, health plans must comply with federal and state coverage and renewal requirements designed to facilitate access to coverage in small group markets (Lippe 2001; Sturm 2001) . Some states have created purchasing pools for small employers to create a larger group (see, for example, Yegian et al. 2000) . In this circumstance, risk selection, as described in the context of large employers in multiple-choice arrangements, may be a factor.
Experience rating is not as effective for small employers because there is likely to be a high degree of year-to-year variation in average medical use in small groups. For employers with less than 100 employees, this problem will remain even with multiple years of experience (Lippe 2001) .
3 Thus, payment rates for small firms often reflect a combination of underwriting (subject to state law) and other practices, such as community rating by class (Sturm 2001) .
This discussion demonstrates that the practices available to address risk selection vary by health in- surance market. It highlights the fact that private employers have more options to address risk selection problems than public purchasers (see also Ellis 2001) . For public purchasers, many of the options available to large private employers are not available as a practical matter, while small employers face risk selection problems that reflect a need for greater risk pooling, rather than for mechanisms to adjust for selection across multiple health plans.
Formal Risk Adjustment, 1998-2000
Overview Consistent with the previous assessment of the types of risk selection problems faced by different health insurance markets, formal risk adjustment is much more common among public than private purchasers ( (Dunn 1998 ; see also Kuttner 1998) .
Researchers have developed several diagnosisbased risk adjustment systems that categorize diagnoses in different ways and for different population groups. They include adjusted clinical groups (ACGs, formerly ambulatory care groups), used in the Buyers Health Care Action Group and in Maryland's Medicaid program (Weiner et al. 1996; Weiner et al. 1998) ; diagnostic cost groups (DCGs), used by Medicare and the Washington Health Care Authority (Ash et al. 1989; Ellis et al. 1996; Greenwald 2000; Pope et al. 2000; Wilson et al. 1998) ; the disability payment system (DPS), renamed chronic illness and disability payment system (CDPS) in its updated version and used by five state Medicaid programs (Kronick et al. 1996; Kronick et al. 2000 ; pers. com. R. Kron-ick, University of California, San Diego, Feb. 26,2001); and marker diagnosis, used (through 2000) by Pacific Health Advantage (see Bertko and Hunt 1998) . 4 Other systems, such as clinical risk groups (CRGs; see Averill et al. 2000) , have been developed recently, but are not in use by major buyers.
The Prevalence of Formal Risk Adjustment, 1998
Estimates of the prevalence of formal risk adjustment for privately insured enrollees in capitated health plans may be calculated with reference to several groups (Table 1 5 This calculation yields an estimate of 1% prevalence in 1998. Modifying the denominator of the calculation to include only the 43% of health plan enrollees who had a choice of plans (which may be provided by the same carrier) in 1997 (i.e., multiplying 60.6 million by .43), the prevalence estimate increases to 3% of health plan enrollees (Marquis and Long 1999a) . 6 Finally, when we limit the denominator to include the 28% of health plan enrollees with a choice of carrier, the estimate increases to nearly 5%.
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Each prevalence estimate reflects a slightly different perspective. If one considers that employers might be more likely to offer a choice of plan or carrier if there were a readily available method of addressing risk selection (i.e., employers' decisions about the number of plans or carriers to offer is endogenous to the availability of formal risk adjustment mechanisms), the 1% prevalence estimate is the relevant number. On the other hand, the 3% estimate reflects the prevalence of formal risk adjustment arrangements where employees may experience risk selection in their choice of products. Similarly, the 5% estimate reflects settings that are most likely to result in selection problems at the insurer/carrier level.
The key fact (putting aside for a moment the state employee groups) is that nationally there are only three private employer coalitions-covering a total of 396,000 people-that make use of formal risk adjustment. From any denominator standpoint, these 396,000 people are a small fraction of the private employer market.
It is important to stress that all of these calculations are estimates limited by the data we have available.
We cannot be certain that our efforts were successful in identifying all instances of formal risk adjustment. These imperfect estimates nonetheless serve to illustrate that, regardless of the estimation method, the prevalence of private formal risk adjustment is low, particularly relative to public programs (Figure 1) . Overall, premium payments are risk adjusted formally for about one-fifth of all (public and private) enrollees in fully capitated health plans. For the 15.3 million health plan enrollees in the Medicare and Medicaid programs, premiums are adjusted for all Medicare enrollees and virtually all Medicaid enrollees. With regard to use of formal risk adjustment, the contrast between private and public purchasers is dramatic.
Over the past several years, there has been movement from demographic to diagnosis-based risk adjustment among many of the programs that use formal risk adjustment. In particular, the Medicare program has begun to phase in diagnosis-based adjustment; the Delaware, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Tennessee Medicaid programs have implemented diagnosis-based adjustment; the Washington state employee program has shifted completely to diagnosisbased adjustment; and the Missouri state employee program has shifted from marker diagnosis to the DCG system. However, we have found no evidence of increased use of formal risk adjustment by private purchasers in 1999 or 2000 ( Table 2 ).
The Medicare Program
As of 1998, Medicare capitation rates paid to health plans were based on average costs per Medicare beneficiary in a geographic region, adjusted for the demographic factors age, sex, welfare status, and institutional status (Greenwald et al. 1998 9 This system is based on hospital inpatient data, although HCFA is investigating a transition to a diagnosis-based system that includes ambulatory data as well (Ingber 2000) .
Medicaid
For about nine million of Medicaid's 9.2 million managed care enrollees, premiums are risk adjusted according to formulas determined by each state program. According to a 1998 Urban Institute survey, 37 of 41 responding states with fully capitated Medicaid managed care programs adjust for demographic variables such as age and gender (Holahan, Rangarajan, and Shirmer 1999) . A separate survey found that 38 states adjust payments for beneficiary eligibility category, such as receipt of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) by people with disabilities (NASHP 1999). Several states also make separate payments for specific health conditions, such as pregnancy and HIV/AIDS (Holahan, Rangarajan, and Shirmer 1999) . All states that provided information about their payment systems in the Urban Institute survey perform some degree of formal adjustment.
A growing number of states use health status or diagnosis-based risk adjustment mechanisms in their Medicaid managed care programs. Colorado implemented risk adjustment using the disability payment system in 1997 (Tollen and Rothman, 1998) . Also in 1997, Maryland began risk adjustment with ACGs as a component of its managed care program (Weiner et al. 1998 ). In 1998, for Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities, Oregon adjusted plan payments using the DPS, and Utah adjusted plan payments using marker diagnoses (Kronick et al. 2000) . In 2000, New Jersey began to adjust premium payments for its SSI population using the DPS (pers. com., R. Kronick, UCSD, Feb. 26, 2001) . Also in 2000, Delaware, Tennessee, and Utah implemented diagnosis based risk adjustment using the chronic illness and disability payment system, the updated version of the DPS (Kronick et al. 2000; pers. com., R. Kronick, UCSD, Feb. 26, 2001 ). In addition, Minnesota began using ACGs to adjust premiums for its Medicaid population receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) (affecting 5% of capitation payments) (Kronick et al. 2000) .
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State Employees
We are aware of two agencies responsible for health insurance for state employees, the Washington State Health Care Authority and the Missouri Consolidated Health Care Plan, that adjust premiums with health status information as of 2000 (see Wilson et al. 1998 ). Both agencies incorporated formal risk ad- justment into their payment practices soon after they became responsible for purchasing insurance on behalf of state employees. Nationwide, information on the use of risk adjustment by state employee plans has not been gathered since 1994 (Maciejewski, Dowd, and Feldman 1997) . The Washington State Health Care Authority (HCA), established in 1988, has relied on demographic risk adjustment since 1989. In 1998, the HCA began phasing in diagnosis-based risk adjustment using DCGs for its 240,000 covered lives (see Wilson et al. 1998 ). The HCA moved from demographic adjustment plus a limited amount of (Ϯ2% of premium) health status adjustment in 1998, to demographic Ϯ5% health status adjustment in 1999, and shifted to full diagnostic risk adjustment in 2000 (pers. The Missouri Consolidated Health Care Plan (CHCP), a quasi-governmental agency, purchases health care for state employees, as well as 700 smaller local public entities such as cities and schools. It has phased in steadily more complex formal risk adjustment systems since it began operation in 1994 (pers. com., H. Curran, CHCP, March 14, 2000). CHCP introduced demographic risk adjustment to its purchasing in 1995, and then implemented the marker diagnosis method in 1997. In 1999, CHCP shifted to the DCG method, which it continued to use in contract year 2000. All 166,000 covered lives were formally risk adjusted in 2000, except for retirees with Medicare coverage. All of these changes occurred during a five-year contract with health plans. A unique feature of the CHCP's approach to diagnostic risk adjustment is the source of its data-a Missouri Department of Health database, rather than data reported by health plans. Hospitals are required to report diagnoses to this database within six months of the end of the calendar year.
Purchasing Coalitions and Pools
We are aware of three instances in which purchasing coalitions or pools apply formal risk adjustment to health plan premium payments: the Buyers Health Care Action Group, Pacific Health Advantage, and Gateway Purchasers for Health. Business coalitions are formed by employers to increase bargaining power with health insurers, typically either with regard to premium negotiations or quality measurement efforts (Fraser et al. 1999) .
The Buyers Health Care Action Group (BHCAG), established in 1991, consists of 28 self-insured employers in the Minneapolis/St. Paul area with approximately 250,000 covered lives (Dunn 1998) . Of these, approximately 140,000 are enrolled in BHCAG's self-insured product, Health Choices. Since 1997, BHCAG has contracted directly with primary care provider networks, referred to as ''care systems,'' rather than with managed care plans (Beeuwkes Buntin and Newhouse 1998; Bodenheimer and Sullivan 1998; Christianson et al. 1999 ).
BHCAG's payment approach is based on ''variable fee-for-service'' payments. Under this arrangement, care systems submit a fee-for-service (FFS) claims target, which is risk adjusted on a quarterly basis using the ACG method (Dunn 1998) . The risk-adjusted claims target is compared to actual fee-for-service claims. Fee-for-service rates for the following quarter are adjusted upward if actual claims are lower than the adjusted target, or adjusted downward if actual claims are higher (Dunn 1998; Knutson 1998) .
Pacific Health Advantage (''PacAdvantage'') originated from 1993 state legislation that created the Health Insurance Plan of California (HIPC) to help small groups achieve the health insurance purchasing benefits of large employers. In 1998, the HIPC covered about 150,000 enrollees (Bertko and Hunt 1998) . The California Managed Risk Medical Insurance Board (MRMIB), the state agency that oversaw the HIPC until 1999, developed and implemented the HIPC's risk adjustment system. The state legislation that established the HIPC required the eventual transfer of its administration to a private entity. The Pacific Business Group on Health (PBGH), a nonprofit purchasing coalition, assumed this responsibility on July 1, 1999, and the name of the HIPC was changed to Pacific Health Advantage.
The number of covered lives in Pacific Health Advantage/HIPC has remained constant over the past few years, at approximately 150,000. The marker diagnosis risk adjustment methodology initially remained the same since the shift in administration. However, in 2000, data analysis was underway to prepare for a shift to the DCG method beginning in January 2001 (pers. com., S. Hunt, Price Waterhouse Coopers, March 6, 2000; E. Hoo, PBGH, March 30, 2000 and Dec. 8, 2000; Yegian et al. 2000) . Under marker diagnosis, a value for each health plan's risk is calculated based on the age, gender, contract (family) size, and ''marker diagnosis'' mix of the plan relative to the HIPC average. ''Marker diagnoses'' are high-cost (Ͼ$15,000 per year) diagnoses that are associated with a relatively predictable annual inpatient stay. The marker diagnosis feature makes the system less data intensive and easier to implement than a comprehensive diagnostic risk adjustment system (Beeuwkes Buntin and Newhouse 1998; Bertko and Hunt 1998; Dunn 1998; HIPC 1996) . In both the marker diagnosis and DCG systems, risk adjustment is only ''triggered'' if risk assessments fall outside a Ϯ5% ''tolerance'' level in PacAdvantage (Dunn 1998; pers. com., E. Hoo, PBGH, Dec. 8, 2000 ; see also Yegian et al. 2000) .
Based in St. Louis, Gateway Purchasers for Health is comprised of 34 large employers, and in 2000 negotiated on behalf of 117,500 covered lives (pers. com., L. Probst, Gateway, March 10, 2000; GAO 1997; Beeuwkes Buntin and Newhouse 1998). In 1998, formal risk adjustment was based on age, gender, and family size. For 2000, the alliance agreed that industry class would also be utilized if systematic differences by industry were indicated, but no such differences were present in 2000 (pers. com., L. Probst, Gateway, April 20, 2001) . Gateway also has investigated the possibility of moving to diagnosisbased risk adjustment; however, there was no consensus among employers in the coalition that this should be done (pers. com., L. Probst, Gateway, March 10, 2000).
Purchaser Assessments of Formal Risk Adjustment
The very low prevalence of formal risk adjustment in private insurance is not an indication of dissatisfaction with risk adjustment among those who have implemented it. Administrators of the programs described in this paper consistently stated that formal risk adjustment is a valuable component of their purchasing strategy. Many also emphasized, however, that it is data and resource intensive. Yet despite this burden, these administrators expressed interest in moving to even more complex levels of formal risk adjustment-either from demographic to diagnosisbased adjustments, or to adjusting payments at the provider level in addition to plan premiums.
The various private purchasers offered a range of positive opinions about risk adjustment. The Washington State Health Care Authority perceives that risk adjustment is a valuable component of its purchasing strategy, making both the HCA and health plans more effective in their respective roles as purchasers and providers of care (pers. com., J. Hamilton, March 10, 2000) . In the Missouri Consolidated Health Care Plan, formal risk adjustment is perceived to be ''reasonably well accepted'' by contracting health plans and to be a ''beneficial'' purchasing tool (pers. com. H. Curran, CHCP, March 14, 2000). BHCAG similarly considers formal risk adjustment to be an important aspect of its purchasing approach (pers. com., A. Robinow, March 14, 2000) .
The private purchasers using formal risk adjustment also related information about the challenges of implementing this practice. The Washington State Health Care Authority regarded its approach of phasing in adjustment as a way to preserve plan participation in a risk-adjusted payment system. A major lesson for the HCA was that the three-year phase-in provided necessary time for some plans to improve the quality of data needed to implement formal risk adjustment. The Missouri Consolidated Health Care Plan also noted that the formal risk adjustment process is resource intensive with respect to gathering data, and found that it required ongoing communication with stakeholders about how the process works and why it is useful. To improve the formal risk adjustment process, the Buyers Health Care Action Group established an ACG Users Group in 1997 to facilitate communication and ultimately achieve more standardized data reporting (Knutson 1998) . The Users Group has proven to be instrumental in promoting better understanding and more consistent reporting by care groups (pers. com., A. Robinow, BHCAG, March 14, 2000). Still, Christianson et al. (1999) report that while BHCAG providers support the idea of formal risk adjustment, some are uncertain about its effectiveness in measuring risk. Overall, purchasers indicate that formal risk adjustment serves an important purpose, but they also acknowledge that there are challenges to its implementation.
''Cousins'' of Formal Risk Adjustment
Two other approaches are related to, but distinct from, formal risk adjustment: risk assessment, and risk adjustment of employee premium contributions. Public and private purchasers, including the Group Insurance Commission in Massachusetts (GIC), the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), and the Pacific Business Group on Health, rely on demographic or diagnosis-based analyses to assess risk with individual-level data and then seek to negotiate better rates from managed care plans. The University of California and Harvard University are two employers that adjust the contribution made on behalf of employees using demographic information to address the employee selection problem.
Risk Assessment/Rate Negotiation
Purchasers may conduct risk assessment without using the information to adjust premiums. We provide examples of risk assessment used in the context of rate negotiation by the Pacific Business Group on Health, CalPERS, and the Group Insurance Commission of Massachusetts. In addition to these examples, ACGs are also used for risk assessment by a few employers (pers. com., N. Smith, Computer Sciences Corp., April 5, 2000) . We are not aware of any estimates of the overall frequency of this practice. Risk assessment yields information to a payer that might be useful in bargaining with plans about rates and coverage.
The PBGH, which now administers the California HIPC/Pacific Health Advantage described earlier, represents a coalition of 32 large private and public employers in California and Arizona with more than three million covered lives. The PBGH Negotiating Alliance consists of a subset of 21 employers with 400,000 covered lives. In 1998, with the aid of a foundation grant, PBGH and researchers from Kaiser Permanente and the University of California, San Francisco, tested four risk adjustment models, but decided not to implement any of the models in the near term (Beeuwkes Buntin and Newhouse 1998). However, PBGH does rely on risk data to negotiate premiums for employers participating in the Negotiating Alliance. In addition, beginning in 1999, PBGH conducted a type of demographic risk adjustment of employer contributions to the Negotiating Alliance purchasing pool when it shifted money across employers based on the age and sex tiers of their employees (pers. com., S. Hunt, Price Waterhouse Coopers, March 6, 2000; E. Hoo, PBGH, Dec. 8, 2000) .
At least two state employee purchasers also rely on risk assessment. CalPERS, one of the largest public employee benefits administrators, uses demographic risk assessment in its rate target-setting process. The rate targets are used to negotiate premiums with HMOs (Beeuwkes Buntin and Newhouse 1998). In 2000, the GIC completed data analysis on the distribution of risk across its contracting health plans using DCGs. However, because the GIC is required by statute to pay a fixed share of the employee premium (currently 85%), it cannot directly adjust the employee contribution. Therefore, as of 2000, the GIC relied on the information from risk assessment to assist in its rate negotiations with contracting health plans (pers. com., H. Rubinstein, GIC, May 12, 2000) . In addition, the GIC was studying other risk adjustment alternatives that would not involve modification of the current employee contribution structure. GIC recently voted to implement formal risk adjustment without altering employee contributions; this change was to go into effect in July 2001, the beginning of the state's 2002 fiscal year (pers. com., H. Rubinstein, GIC, March 9, 2001 ).
Risk Adjustment of Premium Contributions
Both the University of California and Harvard University began to risk adjust premium contributions toward employees' health insurance in 2000. We have not made an attempt to systematically collect data on this practice, although we believe these two employers are innovative in this regard. Under a defined contribution system (where the employer pays the same amount toward any plan), adverse selection across health plans may increase the cost of a health plan with more generous benefits and/or higher-risk enrollees. The idea behind adjusting premium contributions is to create a system in which employees face cost differences among health plans that reflect differences in the value of the benefits offered, rather than the average health status of enrollees choosing a particular health plan.
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The University of California (UC) began adjusting its premium contribution toward each plan based on the age, gender, and family size in the plan in calendar year 2000 (pers. com., M. French, University of California Office of the President [UCOP], March 29, 2000) . Prior to this shift, UC's premium contribution was at the level of the lowest priced HMO.
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The purpose of the new strategy is to present employees with prices that differ because of plan efficiency and benefit design, rather than differences in health risk across the contracting plans (pers. com., R. Kronick, UCSD, March 6, 2000) . Overall, changes in employee contributions were small following risk adjustment, on the order of a $3 to $4 increase per month for those in the lowest-cost plan (pers. com., M. French, UCOP, March 29, 2000) . Employee premium contributions to the more generous POS plan increased from $45 to $55 in 2000, but would have increased to more than $100 per month without risk adjustment. Risk adjustment of UC contributions serves two goals: to prevent an exodus from the POS plan, and to put health plans ''on notice'' of further changes to come. Ultimately, UC intends to adjust its premium payments to plans as well as develop systems to adjust at the provider level (pers. com., M. French, UCOP, March 29, 2000) .
Harvard University began to adjust contribution amounts to plans based on the age and gender of enrollees, for reasons similar to those of the University of California. In addition, provisions were made to protect plans from high-cost claims exceeding $10,000. Harvard subsidizes the increased contributions to the one plan with above-average risk by devoting additional university resources to the plan. Risk adjustment of premium contributions, similar to the UC example, is intended to compensate for adverse selection among the health plans currently contracting with Harvard and to maintain the viability of all existing plan options.
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Conclusion
We hope that this investigation of the prevalence of formal risk adjustment will spark further dialogue regarding methods to address risk selection in private, as well as public, health insurance markets. The private sector experience contrasts sharply with that of the major public purchasers, Medicare and Medicaid. One interpretation of this difference is that lower prevalence of formal risk adjustment in the private sector is consistent with other research showing that the adoption of managed competition principles is relatively uncommon in the private sector, but more common among federal and state employers (Marquis and Long 1999a, 1999b) . These results invite further investigation as to why regulators have adopted formal risk adjustment, but private purchasers, for the most part, have not.
Notes
This paper was prepared for the conference, ''Private Employers and Risk Adjustment,'' held February 8-9, 2000, and hosted Marquis and Long 1999a and 1999b .) 8 Research suggests that use of principal inpatient diagnoses will improve the explanatory power of the risk adjustment formula from its current 1% to 5% to 6% (Ellis et al. 1996) .
9 In addition, geographic adjustments are made to account for regional variations in costs. 10 In addition, Minnesota is finalizing plans to pilot test use of the CDPS to adjust premium payments to several health plans in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area for the under-65 disabled population by no later than 2002 (pers. com., D. Knutson, May 11, 2001 ). 11 It is more common for employers to pay more on behalf of a more generous plan-for example, paying 60% of the premiums for any plan chosen, without specifically risk adjusting the premium contribution (Hunt et al. 1997; Feldman, Dowd, and Maciejewski 2001) . This reduces cost differences among plans from the employee perspective. 12 The University of California implemented a defined contribution in the amount of the lowest-cost health plan in 1994. Following this shift, its indemnity plan entered a ''death spiral'': between 1993 and 1996, active employee enrollment in the indemnity plan dropped by 84% (Buchmueller 1998) . 13 Implementation of risk adjustment follows Harvard's shift to a defined premium contribution in 1995. This change resulted in a ''death spiral'' for the PPO plan, with employee contributions increasing from roughly $500 in 1994 to $2,100 in 1996, as younger enrollees with lower-than-average costs disenrolled at greater rates (Cutler and Reber 1998) .
